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Introduction
The general setting examined in Mirrlees (1971) seminal paper provides fairly limited insights regarding the desirable properties of the optimal non-linear tax schedule, except that its marginal rate is nonnegative. When confining attention to bounded skill distributions, Sadka (1976) and Seade (1977) were nonetheless able to demonstrate that the marginal tax rate levied on the individual with the highest skill level is optimally set to zero (known henceforth as the zero-tax at the top result). This led Sadka (1976) to conclude, assuming that the tax schedule is continuous in income, that the marginal tax rate cannot be monotonically rising with respect to income; that is the marginal tax rate must decline at high incomes [see also the elaborate discussion in Mankiw et al. (2009) ].
Later simulations [see Tuomala (1990) ] demonstrate the desirability of setting declining marginal tax rates for a broad range of high incomes.
Prima-facie, the zero tax at the top property and its implied marginal-tax regression within the range of high income levels, stands in sharp contrast to observed patterns of progressive income tax schedules in most OECD countries, where, as is often the case, the statutory marginal tax rates increase with respect to income (usually in a piece-wise linear fashion). However, the optimal tax analyzed in the literature refers to the overall taxtransfer system and not merely to the statutory tax system. Indeed, with this broader look at the tax system, the marginal-progression may dampen considerably in practice. In most countries, where the bulk of welfare (transfer) programs are means-tested (e.g., guaranteed subsistence income level programs), the effective (implicit) marginal tax rates at the bottom of the income distribution are fairly high, and may well exceed the statutory marginal income tax rates at the high end of the income distribution.
Nonetheless, the zero tax at the top result still remained highly controversial. In two influential papers, Diamond (1998) and Saez (2001) challenged this result. Diamond (1998) , examining a quasi-linear utility and Saez (2001) , extending the analysis to incorporate income effects, have demonstrated that with unbounded distributions, the zero tax at the top fails to hold under reasonable parametric assumptions regarding the skill distribution. Diamond and Saez (2011) conclude that the result is of little policy relevance and in any case, is only a local property which applies to the very top earner, even when bounded distributions are allowed for.
In this paper we revisit the zero tax at the top result. We deviate from the standard Mirrleesian setting and the bulk of the subsequent literature which focus on the closed economy case, by allowing for labor migration. Incorporating this extensive margin consideration into the standard framework, we examine the role played by international tax competition in shaping the optimal tax-and-transfer system. We show that the optimal asymptotic marginal tax rate is zero when migration is taken into account. We further demonstrate by simulations that there exists an income threshold above which the optimal marginal tax rate is approximately set to zero. Notably, the 'lump-sum' tax over this range of high income levels is set at its Laffer rate, maximizing tax revenues against the backdrop of the disincentive associated with migration.
The structure of the paper is as follows: in the next section we describe the analytical framework. We describe the tax-transfer choice of each national government in Section 3. Section 4 characterizes the optimal tax-transfer policy in the international tax competition equilibrium. Some useful numerical simulations are offered in Section 5.
Section 6 concludes.
The Model
We consider a global economy which is comprised of two identical countries (i=1, 2).
World population is normalized to a measure of 2. Each country produces a single consumption good employing labor inputs with different skill levels. We follow Mirrlees (1971) by assuming that the production technology exhibits constant returns to scale and perfect substitutability across skill levels.
We assume that individuals differ in two attributes: (i) innate productive ability (skill-level), (ii) mobility costs (between the two countries). The individual skill level is denoted by θ and is distributed according to the cumulative distribution function ( )
with strictly positive densities, ( ) f θ , over the support [ , ) θ ∞ . We follow Mirrlees (1971) by assuming that skill levels are private information unobserved by the government.
Notice that we are allowing for general skill distributions and, in particular, allow for an unbounded support.
Turning next to mobility costs, we assume that in the absence of any differences between the two countries (in terms of the fiscal policy implemented by the respective local governments) the world population of each skill-group is equally divided between the two countries (population in each country would be given by a unit measure in such a case (1)
, where c denotes consumption (gross of migration costs), l denotes labor, d is an indicator function assuming the value of one if the individual migrates and zero otherwise, and ) (⋅ h is strictly increasing and strictly convex. To ensure interior solutions throughout INADA conditions are assumed to hold.
For later purposes, as is common in the optimal tax literature, we reformulate the utility function (gross of migration costs) and represent it as a function of gross income = , which immediately follows from condition (6) when symmetry is imposed.
For later purposes, it would be useful to re-formulate the revenue constraint in (5), employing the condition in (2) and the identityT y c ≡ − , to obtain the following expression:
Characterization of the Optimal Policy in Equilibrium
We next turn to solve the optimization program as an optimal control problem employing Pontryagin's maximum principle. We choose ( ) y θ as the control variable and ( ) V θ as the state variable. Formulating the Hamiltonian yields:
Formulating the necessary conditions for optimality yields:
In addition the two transversality conditions hold:
We let 
In order to simplify our exposition, we will henceforth focus on the Rawlsian government case; namely, the case in which the government is seeking to maximize the well-being of the least well-off individual. Employing the first-order conditions in (10) and (11), the transversality conditions in (12) and the symmetry property, yields, following some rearrangements (see appendix A for details), the following expression that characterizes the optimal marginal tax rate:
where y ε denotes the labor supply elasticity.
It is straightforward to verify that in the limiting case of no migration (an autarky), where δ → ∞ , the condition in (14) reduces to the standard condition found in the literature [see Diamond (1998) and Salanie (2003) ]:
The additional component, given by the first term of the expression on the right-hand side of condition (14), captures the restraining effect of migration on the extent of redistribution, reflected by reduced marginal tax rates relative to the autarky setting with no migration in place.
The expression in (14) is quite complex, as the income-distribution is endogenously [that is,
, it follows by construction that:
Differentiating the expression in (15) with respect to θ , employing the individual firstorder condition and following some algebraic manipulations (see appendix B for details),
one can obtain the following condition that relates the densities f and g [which replicates condition (13) in Saez (2001) ]:
Substituting from the conditions in (15) and (16) into (14) and re-arranging, yields:
Whereas the differential equation given in (17) is fairly complex and does not admit for a general closed-form solution, one can still provide some partial characterization of its properties, summarized in the following proposition (the proof is relegated to appendix
The proposition indicates that the asymptotic marginal tax rate is zero. In simulations we demonstrate that the zero-marginal tax result is far from being a local property by showing that there exist a whole range of income levels at the higher end of the income distribution for which the optimum tax is approximately given by a lump-sum.
Our results stand in sharp contrast to previous results in the optimal tax literature. The zero tax at the top property [Sadka (1976) and Seade (1977) ] only applies to the topearner and is restricted to bounded income distributions. The subsequent literature [Diamond (1998) and Saez (2001) ], focusing on unbounded distributions, suggests that a zero marginal tax cannot be part of the optimal schedule for empirically reasonable income distributions. The economic rationale behind the result we derive is straightforward. In the absence of migration, the incentive constraint faced by the local 1
In the proof of the proposition we invoke an additional technical assumption that
This assumption is supported by standard assumptions in the literature [e.g., assuming an iso-elastic disutility from labor and that the income distribution is approximated by a Pareto distribution above a certain income level, as in Diamond (1998) , amongst others].
government is related to the intensive margin, that is, the tax schedule is designed in a way that ensures no mimicking by the high skilled (attempting to mimic their low-skilled counterparts in order to reduce their tax liability). With migration in place, an extensive margin comes into play, as the local government attempts to attract high-skill migrants from the neighboring country (or, alternatively, to mitigate the incentive of high-skill residents to migrate to the other country). For the very high skill population (the top range of the income distribution) the extensive margin becomes highly manifest and hence the dominant one. In this range of incomes, the government is approximately levying a lumpsum tax given by / 2 δ (see the proof of the proposition in appendix C). The lump-sum tax is set at its Laffer rate; namely, set at the rate which maximizes total tax revenues (taking into account the disincentive effect on migration). Notice that over the range in which the tax is set to be lump-sum, (local) no mimicking incentives are trivially satisfied.
Thus, the only focus is indeed on migration (extensive margin) incentives. To see why the
Laffer rate is indeed given by / 2 δ , denote by ( ) V θ the utility (gross of migration costs)
derived by a typical individual of skill level θ in country 1 in the absence of taxes.
Further denote by T the lump sum tax set by country 1. By virtue of quasi-linearity (and the nature of a lump-sum tax that induces no substitution effect) the net-of-tax utility (gross of migration costs) derived by a θ -type individual in country 1 is given by ( ) V θ -
T. Denoting by 2 ( )
V θ the utility (gross of migration costs) derived by a typical individual of skill level θ in country 2, by virtue of the earlier derivations [condition (6)], the measure of individuals of type θ in country 1, is given by:
The total tax revenues associated with a lump-sum tax, T, raised from individuals of skill level θ , denoted by ( , ) TR T θ , is then given by:
Differentiating the expression in (19) with respect to T and equating to zero, imposing the
Numerical Simulations
As we were unable to obtain a closed-form solution for the differential equation in equation (17), we resort to numerical solution of the optimal tax schedule. This will enable us to examine the effect of migration on the tax schedule, and specifically on the marginal tax rate which the higher skilled individuals are faced with. We make several parametric assumptions. We first assume that the skill level is distributed according to a Pareto distribution; namely,
Employing (15) and (16), it then follows that:
We further assume, as is common in the literature [see Diamond (1998) and substituting into (17) yields:
where B is a constant. Further simplifying the differential equation in (22) to eliminate the integral expression, we fully differentiate the expression in (22) with respect to y, yielding:
Employing (21) and (22) and re-arranging yields,
( )
We let the function J(y) denote the total tax revenues from individuals whose income level is lower than or equal to y, formally given by:
The revenue constraint faced by the government is characterized therefore by the differential equation given in condition (26) and the associated boundary condition,
The optimal tax schedule is the solution to the system of differential equations given by (24) and (26) and three boundary conditions: Notice that the second boundary condition follows from the fact that by virtue of the proposition the asymptotic marginal tax is zero. Further notice that the latter boundary condition is obtained by substitution into (22), employing our assumption that the total tax revenues raised by the government is zero.
We follow Gruber and Saez (2002) δ . Moreover, the interval of incomes over which individuals are faced with a zero marginal tax rate is expanding as the costs of migration decrease. In the limiting cost-less migration case, the optimal schedule converges to the (laissez-faire) zero-tax schedule reflecting an extreme race to the bottom, in which, trivially, all individuals are faced with a zero marginal tax rate. Finally, the figure indicates that the marginal tax rates are declining over the entire range of incomes. In fact, this latter property can be proved under our parametric assumptions (see appendix D).
Figure 1: The effect of migration on the optimal tax schedule
This result we obtain is an extension of Piaser (2007), who demonstrates that the patterns of the binding self-selection constraints crucially hinge on the level of migration costs. In a two type model Piaser (2007) demonstrates that when the costs of migration are sufficiently small, both self-selection constraints will be non-binding in the optimal solution. In contrast, when migration costs are large enough, including the limiting case of autarky, the self-selection constraint of the high-skill individual will bind (the standard case in the literature). This implies that for sufficiently small migration costs, there will be zero tax at the bottom as well as at the top (a property holding for large migration costs as well). The (lump-sum) tax levied on the high-skill residents in this case is set (optimally) at the Laffer level; namely, the tax is set so as to maximize the total revenues raised from the high-skill population. Piaser thus demonstrates that the range in which individuals are faced with a zero marginal tax rate is expanding as migration costs decrease. To see the intuition for this result, recall that an egalitarian government seeking to redistribute wealth from the high-skill towards the low-skill residents is essentially faced with two challenges. The first one is the standard one on the intensive margin (which applies in the case of an autarky, as well) and derives from the mimicking threat of high skill individuals. The second one on the extensive margin (which applies only when tax competition takes place) derives from the migration threat of high-skill residents. With large enough migration costs, the impact of the extensive margin consideration (the potential threat of a massive migration of the high-skill) is relatively small; hence, the standard result (as in the case of autarky) applies. When migration costs are small enough the migration incentive comes into play. Although the government can increase the tax burden shifted on the high-skill residents without inducing the latter to mimic, the reduction in the tax base due to the ensued migration is large enough to offset the gain from increasing the tax rate. We find in the continuum case similar patterns. Most importantly, we show that a case for levying a zero marginal tax at the top is established, even when the skill distribution is unbounded. Moreover the property holds over an interval of skill levels, rather than being a local property holding for the top-earning individual only (as is the standard argument in the literature with no migration and a bounded skill distribution).
An alternative way to illustrate the relationship between the costs of migration and the desirability of levying a zero marginal tax rate is given in figure 2 below. The figure depicts for different costs of migration the income threshold above which individuals are faced with a marginal tax rate lower than or equal to 1%. As can be observed, reduced migration costs imply that a higher fraction of the population is faced with an (almost) zero marginal tax rate. 
Conclusion
One of the most controversial results in the optimal tax literature was the zero tax at the top property due to Sadka (1976) and Seade (1977) , arguing that when the underlying skill distribution is bounded, the optimal marginal tax rate levied on the top earning individual should be set to zero. A corollary of this result is the desirability of setting declining marginal tax rates at the top end of the income distribution. Diamond (1998) , examining the quasi-linear utility specification and Saez (2001) , extending the analysis by that for empirically relevant unbounded skill distributions, the asymptotic optimal marginal tax rate should be bounded away from zero. In this paper we revisit the result, demonstrating that when migration consideration are taken into account, in a simple tax competition framework, there exists an income threshold above which the optimal marginal tax rate should be approximately set to zero. The optimal lump-sum tax levied on income levels at the top end should be set at its Laffer rate, maximizing tax revenues against the backdrop of migration threats. Moreover, we show that the range in which the optimal marginal tax is set to zero is widening, as migration costs decrease.
Appendix A: Derivation of Condition (14)
In the symmetric equilibrium, by construction, the tax schedules implemented by both countries are identical and, therefore, no migration takes place. By virtue of the symmetry property the condition in (11) simplifies to:
Integrating the expression in (A1) and employing the transversality condition for the limiting skill level given in (12), yields:
Employing the revenue constraint in (8) and the transversality condition for the lowerbound skill level, given in (12), yields:
Next we define the following function, which measures the average social marginal utility of income over the interval [ , ) θ ∞ :
Employing (A4), one can re-formulate the expression in (A2) to obtain:
The first order condition for the individual optimization program implies,
Denoting the net hourly wage-rate earned by an individual of skill-level θ by ( )
, the first order condition in (A7) can be re-written as:
Differentiating the first-order condition in (A7') with respect to the net hourly wage-rate, n θ , it is straightforward to derive the elasticity of the pre-tax income, which is then given by:
Employing (A7), (A7') and (A8) yields:
Substituting from (A5), (A6), (A7) and (A9) into (10) yields after re-arrangement:
We will hence focus our attention on the Rawlsian case, in which social welfare is given then yields:
Appendix B: Derivation of Expression (16)
By fully differentiating the individual first-order condition in (A6) with respect to θ , assuming a local linear approximation of the tax schedule, one obtains:
which upon re-arrangement holds if-and-only-if:
Substituting from (A8) into (B2) implies that:
Differentiation of the expression in (15) with respect to θ yields:
Substituting for the term '( ) y θ from (B3) into (B4), and re-arranging, yields the expression given in (16).
Appendix C: Proof of the Proposition
We prove the proposition in several steps organized into a series of lemmas.
Proof: Assume by negation that '( ) 0 T y = and( ) / 2 T y δ < . Re-arranging the expression in (17) yields,
. Fully differentiating the expression in (17') with respect to y yields,
Substituting from (17') into (C1) yields,
Substituting '( ) 0 T y = into (C2) and re-arranging yields,
It follows from (C3) and by our presumption that( ) / 2
T y ε + < for sufficiently small 0 ε > . That is, the marginal tax rate is negative within a small neighborhood to the right of ŷ . As the marginal tax rate is zero atŷ , it follows from the condition in (17') that:
It follows by virtue of (C4) and our presumption that ( ) an income level for which the marginal tax rate is zero within the interval (ŷ , y''). Let A denote the (non-empty and bounded) set of all income levels within the interval (ŷ , y'') for which the marginal tax rate is zero, and further denote by y the greatest lowerbound of the set A. By construction, it follows thatŷ y > . By virtue of (17') and the definition of y , it follows that:
It further follows that '( ) 0 T y < for allŷ y y < < . Hence, it follows that ( ) / 2 T y δ < for allŷ y y < < , which, by virtue of (C5), implies that:
Thus we obtain a contradiction to (C4).
In exactly the same manner (the formal steps are therefore omitted) one can prove by negation that it cannot be the case that ' ( As '( ) 0 T y < , it follows by virtue of (17') that: which the marginal tax rate is zero. Let A denote the (non-empty and bounded from below) set of all income levels within the interval (ŷ , ∞ ) for which the marginal tax rate is zero, and further denote by y the greatest lower-bound of the set A. By construction, it follows thatŷ y > . By virtue of (17') and the definition of y , it further follows that:
It further follows that '( ) 0 T y < for allŷ y y < < . Hence, it follows that ( ) / 2 T y δ < for allŷ y y < < , which, by virtue of (C8), implies that:
Thus we obtain a contradiction to (C7). Thus we have established that: y y y y < < < , for which '( ) 0 T y = .
Let A denote the (non-empty and bounded) set of all income levels within the interval (y',ŷ ) for which the marginal tax rate is zero, and further denote by y the least upperbound of the set A. By construction, it follows thatŷ y < . By virtue of the definition of y , it follows that:
It further follows by the definition of y that '( ) 0 T y < for allŷ y y < ≤ . By virtue of
T y δ < for allŷ y y < ≤ , which implies that:
Thus we obtain a contradiction to (C10).
This establishes the claim.
Lemma 3: '( ) 0 T y ≥ for all y.
Proof: By virtue of (17') the marginal tax rate faced by the individual with the lowest income level is given by: By virtue of (17') it then follows that '( ') 0 T y < , which contradicts lemma 3. We conclude that ( ) T y is bounded from above by / 2 δ . As T(y) is non-decreasing, it follows that T(y) converges to some finite limit. Let lim ( ) 
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